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The "right to be forgotten,” adopted in the European Union, enables individuals to
remove online content about them from EU-based search engines, such as
Google.co.uk. An EU privacy panel has proposed that this right should be expanded
to all search engines, including those based in the United States. As the right is in
tension with American privacy and free speech principles, the prospective
application of the right to U.S.-based search engines raises serious concerns.
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, seeking to ensure that privacy kept pace
with emerging technologies, offered the theoretical ingredients for a distinctively
American “right to privacy.” Warren and Brandeis argued that each individual has the
right to determine “to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others.” They acknowledged, however, that this right was “lost”
once the individual had publicly shared or “published” such information.
While this right holds that an individual’s privacy interests in information fades if the
individual places the information in the public sphere, the right to be forgotten posits
that an individual retains privacy interests in public information even if the individual
himself carried the information across the private-public divide. This is the case even
if the information in question is factually accurate. As such, the scope of such a
cognizable privacy interest far exceeds, and contradicts, the American understanding
of individual privacy.
Even if there was a normative basis to enlarge individual privacy in the United States
to a degree commensurate with its European counterpart, privacy does not operate
in a vacuum. Privacy rights must exist along with other, potentially competing rights,
the most relevant of which for our purposes are free speech rights. Robust free
speech protections, enshrined in the First Amendment, help explain why individual
privacy rights cannot be as expansive as those contemplated by the right to be
forgotten.
The vision of a marketplace of ideas illustrates why our society places a premium on
free speech. As part of our DNA, we believe that, in the marketplace of ideas, the
value or truth of information will spring forth from the open consideration of
competing opinions, viewpoints, and perspectives. The availability and discussion of
that information, when relevant to policy and policymakers, can enrich and enhance
our capacity for self-governance.
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